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Introduction
The question of the value of religion presses upon us today more
than ever. On the one hand there are those who question its validity
from the standpoint of an extreme scientific naturalism. For them
religion is an atavistic remnant from the past, a storehouse of super-
stitious nonsense plaguing humanity. None of it is to be taken very
seriously, except, perhaps, in order to reject it unconditionally. On
the other hand there are persons who take what they call “religion”
very seriously. For them religion functions to define the members
of their group as the “good ones” standing over against a world of
evil enemies that must be vanquished. This kind of religion too
often can encourage a kind of extremism ending in violence, for at
its heart lies a violent rejection of anything perceived as foreign or
different. Between these two extremes lie many of us. We recognize
the value of science, willingly conceding that all natural phenomena
must be explained naturalistically. The Enlightenment changed us;
modernism and postmodernism changed us, and pre-Enlightenment
religion is no longer a possibility for us. Yet we are loath to accept
that this means that we must banish anything having transcendental
significance from our lives. Still, we also recognize that religion can
be dangerous. Religion is dangerous when it becomes absolutist and
Manichean, that is, when it mistakes what always must be a finite and
conditioned apprehension of the transcendent for the transcendent
ground itself, and when it further bases its reactionary exclusion
of what it perceives as other on this fundamental mistake. In such
cases, religion degenerates into idolatry. Idolatry, however, is not only
the stuff of fundamentalisms. It is a perennial danger tempting each
of us, and it tempts in myriad ways. Authentic religion requires a
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2 Transformation of the Self
certain kind of openness, and a willingness to live with uncertainty.
It requires the recognition of our finitude and of the conditioned
character of all our knowledge; it requires a willingness to depend
on what to us must remain, in fundamental ways, unknown. These
attitudes are very difficult to achieve in practice.
How, then, are we to think about religion such that we can both
answer its naturalistic critics and provide a program for the avoid-
ance of idolatry? A serious engagement with the character of human
finitude is necessary to deal with the latter. The problem that scien-
tific naturalism poses to religion is yet more complex. Any attempt
to mediate between science and religion, however, must come to
terms with the question of human consciousness, for it is human
consciousness that is, after all, our window to the world, however we
may conceive it. It thus appears that the key to mediating between
both a scientific naturalism that denies any possibility of transcen-
dent meaning and a reactionary fundamentalism claiming possession
of absolute truth lies in an investigation of the nature of the sub-
ject, its relation to the world, and the possibility of its relation to a
ground transcending both self and world. This investigation is one
that cannot be constrained by a certain naturalistic bias at the outset.
Such a bias would be in place if the knowing and willing subject
were to be conceived as simply yet another object in the world, that
is, as a bit of brain matter in motion on which supervene certain
strange states of consciousness. In such a case, the phenomenon of
consciousness is merely objectified and made an object in the world.
Here the more difficult questions of the nature of subjectivity as such,
as that which supplies the primordial window upon the world, are
completely bypassed.
It was first and foremost the groundbreaking philosophy of
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) that brought to light the fact that
all knowledge is the product of a fundamental activity of con-
sciousness. For Kant, an investigation of the possibility of objec-
tive knowledge led back to an investigation of the conditions of
the knowing subject. The nature of the subject and the charac-
ter of its fundamental activity, that is, the transcendental condi-
tions of knowledge, were thereby placed at the forefront of philo-
sophical inquiry. Kant’s Copernican revolution in philosophy fueled
a corresponding revolution in theology. Friedrich Daniel Ernst
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Schleiermacher (1768–1834) is often referred to as the father of
modern theology. Influenced by Kant, he placed the subject at
the forefront of theology: it is through consciousness that God
relates to the world. The meaning of theological utterances was
to be traced back to the subject’s religious experience, an experi-
ence whose transcendental conditions could themselves be investi-
gated. This experience is one having both cognitive and volitional
components; both components were understood by Schleiermacher
as fundamentally interrelated and as stemming from the depths of
consciousness. The self experiences the absolute through the imme-
diate self-consciousness; the way the self apprehends its relation
to the absolute in turn conditions the way that world is appre-
hended, valued, and felt. In The Christian Faith Schleiermacher
says of the individual that has undergone a religious transforma-
tion: “now all his activities are differently determined . . . and even
all impressions are differently received—which means that the per-
sonal self-consciousness, too, becomes different” (CF §100.2; KGA
I.13,2 107; 427). Insofar as the personal self-consciousness has been
transformed, the actions that arise from it, too, will be different from
those of the former self. However, Schleiermacher was also aware of
an inverse relation: how the self relates to others conditions the way
that the self is conscious of its absolute dependence. The two poles
are inherently related. As such, central to Schleiermacher’s outlook
was his ethical theory. It is in the sphere of ethics that religion has its
ultimate meaning, for the fruit of all true religion lies in its transfor-
mative power over the self.
Here lies the significance of Schleiermacher’s achievement. His
focus on religious experience and the transcendental conditions of
subjectivity allowed him to provide an account of religion that was
neither reductionistic nor dogmatic.1 Religious experience has its
1 Notable recent European treatments of Schleiermacher’s work dealing with
his analysis of transcendental subjectivity and human finitude are: Peter Grove,
Deutungen des Subjekts: Schleiermachers Philosophie der Religion and Sarah Schmidt,
Die Konstruktion des Endlichen. In Deutungen des Subjekts Grove details Schleierma-
cher’s analysis of subjectivity, paying particular attention to his transcendental analysis
of self-consciousness and how it relates to his philosophy of religion. Schmidt’s study
focuses on Schleiermacher’s Dialectic as an analysis of the conditions of the possi-
bility of knowledge given the character of our finite subjectivity. Another excellent
treatment of Schleiermacher’s ethics is Peter Berner, La Philosophie de Schleiermacher:
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origins in the transcendental conditions of subjectivity itself, and
can therefore not be reduced to or explained in naturalistic terms
alone;2 it is grounded in an absolute that transcends the self. On
the other hand Schleiermacher emphasized this fact, that the absolute
transcends consciousness; as such, the self only experiences the effects
of the absolute on consciousness.3 As Schleiermacher argued in the
Dialectic, the transcendental unity of the self is merely analogous to
the unity of the absolute.4 Moreover, the knowing subject is finite and
situated, and as such can offer only a partial perspective on the world.
This means that all action, if it is to be truly ethical and capable of
refracting the divine love, must proceed from the awareness of the
limited and perspectival character of the self ’s standpoint. It must
be acknowledged that in all human knowing there is no “view from
nowhere;” all acts of knowledge are conditioned by the inherently
particular and subjective standpoint from which they first originate.
This does not imply imprisonment in a solipsistic world, but it does
mean that the construction of knowledge is first and foremost an
inter-subjective enterprise that occurs through dialogue, and that in
this enterprise “beginning in the middle is unavoidable” (Dial KGA II
10/1, 186, §62).
Behind Schleiermacher’s theological achievement lay a rigorous
grappling with fundamental metaphysical problems. As such his the-
ology cannot be adequately understood aside from his philosophy.
Herméneutique, Dialectique, Ethique. Berner’s study emphasizes the relation between
Schleiermacher’s ethics, his theory of knowledge, and his hermeneutics.
2 Andrew Dole is certainly mistaken when he reads Schleiermacher as a determinist
who believed religion could be thoroughly explained naturalistically. See Andrew
Dole, “Schleiermacher and Otto on Religion.” This reading completely ignores the
significance of Schleiermacher’s transcendental analysis of self-consciousness.
3 Robert Adams correctly notes that Schleiermacher’s theological method “is con-
nected with a long tradition of theologians (such as Maimonides and Aquinas) who
have been reluctant to claim positive knowledge of the divine nature as it is in itself. . . .
Schleiermacher insists on the preeminence of the way of causality (CF, 1830, § 50.3).
Indeed, it is hard to think of a theologian who has adhered more rigorously or more
exclusively than he to the way of causality.” “Faith and Religious Knowledge,” 44.
4 Peter Grove’s analysis of central passages of the Dialectic is certainly correct: “Der
entscheidende Schritt besteht darin, daß diese Einheit der Subjecktivität als Analogie
des übersubjektiven Grundes erklärt wird. Der zweite Satz lautet ohne Weglassungen:
‘In diesem also haben wir die Analogie mit dem transcendentalen Grunde, nämlich
die aufhebende Verknüpfung der relativen Gegensäze’ (KGA II/10.1, 266). Deutungen
des Subjekts, 509.
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Moreover, his philosophy is of interest in its own right. This is
especially true of his philosophical ethics, which has as its presup-
position his account of personal identity and the nature of self-
consciousness. Hans-Joachim Birkner has noted: “without a doubt,
Schleiermacher’s philosophical ethics represents his most important
achievement, and in the history of ethics constitutes a completely
original project.”5 More recently, Gunter Scholz has claimed that
Schleiermacher’s ethics “has a far greater significance” than his other
achievements; “it tackles the more important problems, has a much
wider perspective, and can lay claim to greater originality.”6 And
in the Cambridge Companion to Friedrich Schleiermacher, Frederick
Beiser concludes his piece on Schleiermacher’s ethics with the follow-
ing:
If it [Schleiermacher’s ethics] is not recognized as one of the fundamental
areas of his philosophical achievement, the problem lies with the public
rather than the author. Schleiermacher’s comprehensive conception of ethics;
his insistence that ethics broaden its horizons, that it investigate such impor-
tant phenomena such as love, free sociability and friendship; his demand for
the restoration of the highest good; his critique of the fact-norm distinction;
and his insistence that our ethics ultimately depend upon our general meta-
physical view of the world – all these remain a challenge to ethics today. If
the subject is as dreary in 2002 as it was in 1802 it is because we have failed
to listen to powerful voices like his own.7
Because Schleiermacher’s philosophical ethics are inherently
bound up with his metaphysics of the absolute and philosophy of
religion, his ethics is especially relevant to the question of how to
conceive of the relation between religion and ethics. Schleiermacher
presents the two as integrally related. Contra Kant, who sought to
make religious conviction rational by portraying it as the conse-
quence of moral commitment, he grounds virtuous character in the
self ’s relation to the transcendent. In this he is much closer to Plato.
His philosophy thereby offers an original understanding of how ethics
can be grounded in religion, one that avoids the pitfalls plaguing a
5 Hans-Joachim Birkner, Schleiermachers Christliche Sittenlehre im Zusammenhang
seines philosophisch-theologischen Systems, 37.
6 Gunter Scholz, Ethik und Hermeneutik: Schleiermachers Grundlegung des
Geisteswissenshaften, 7.
7 Frederick Beiser, “Schleiermacher’s Ethics,” 79.
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divine command theory of ethics, namely, heteronomy. The religious
self does not act morally because a source external to it commands
it; rather, the self in whom the God-consciousness is dominant is
infused with the divine love. Because the motive for such a person
to act morally is found in the depths of the self as informed by the
divine love, heteronomy is avoided.
By focusing on the transcendental conditions of subjectivity,
Schleiermacher was able to argue that the self ’s relation to the divine
has a direct effect on the self ’s relation to others. The self stands in
relation to the whence of all existence through the immediate self-
consciousness, the point from which all self-consciousness originates.
God can never be an object for consciousness. Representation of
God as such an object is always “a corruption,” “for anything that is
outwardly given must be given as an object exposed to our counter-
influence, however slight this may be” (CF §4.4). Rather, God affects
self-consciousness more in the way of a formal cause infusing a person
with the divine love; this in turn has effects on how the individual
relates to others. This partially grounds Schleiermacher’s original
claim that the relation to God and the relation to the neighbor are
so intrinsically tied to one another that both are identical: “in this
Kingdom of God . . . the establishment and maintenance of the fellow-
ship of each individual with God, and the maintenance and direction
of the fellowship of all members with one another are not separate
achievements but the same” (CF §102).
Schleiermacher’s focus on the transcendental ground of character
allowed him to combine the advantages of an ethic of virtue with an
ethic that also affirms the significance of duty. Through his develop-
ment of the idea that the immediate self-consciousness lies at the root
of both spontaneity and receptivity, Schleiermacher offered a coher-
ent account of how feelings and inclinations, and indeed the whole of
a person’s receptivity, could be morally transformed through reason.
He thereby developed the underpinnings of an insightful moral psy-
chology having the resources to deal with theoretical problems plagu-
ing Kantian ethics. Whereas a good part of Kant’s theory of virtue
rests on the moral autocracy of practical reason over the inclinations,
that is, moral strength of will over recalcitrant desires, Schleiermacher
was able to account for how feelings and desires rooted in the conative
side of human nature could play an important role in the ethical
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expression of the self. His transcendental turn in ethics also allowed
him to affirm both genuine freedom and the unity of an agent’s
character throughout the process of moral transformation.
One of Schleiermacher’s most original contributions to ethics lies
in his analysis of the importance of individuality for ethical life. Indi-
viduals are the primary building blocks of community; the building
of community is the purpose of ethical life. But community can only
be built through an appreciation of the fact that all human knowing
and doing orients itself from a particular and finite standpoint. To be
sure, the standpoint of the individual is one that must be continually
transcended through human communication. But the new perspec-
tive achieved through communication itself still remains a finite and
conditioned one that must itself be transcended through the build-
ing of ever widening circles of community. Schleiermacher’s ethics
begins with an understanding of individuals as particular, embodied
beings having the capacity for communication. The foundations of
his ethical system allow him to acknowledge the ultimate value of the
individual qua individual, that is, the individual in all of his or her
particularity. The individual is irreplaceable; his or her perspective is
unique, non-transposable and indispensable to the ethical commu-
nity. As such, the situation of each individual calls for a particular
range of responses appropriate to it in all of its particularity. Further-
more, the body is the outward sign of the individual’s perpective, the
medium through which he or she communicates, and as such can
become the organ of the spirit.
Schleiermacher’s insights are bolstered by a rigorous metaethical
analysis of the nature of (a) the individual’s relation to the divine
or the absolute; (b) the character of self-consciousness and personal
identity; (c) the relation of the self to others and its effect on self-
consciousness; and (d) the specific character of individuality and its
relation to the formation of the ethical community. This metaethical
analysis ultimately has as its goal Schleiermacher’s attempt to under-
stand the role of Christ as the founder of the Christian ethical com-
munity. His philosophical and ethical analysis has a theological goal:
to make intelligible the life of the Christian community in Christ.
Schleiermacher’s ethics, however, has much to offer both Christians
and non-Christians alike. For in his attempt to make intelligible the
life of the Christian community in Christ, he also developed an ethics
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and philosophy of religion whose starting point is an appreciation of
the role that subjectivity and finitude plays in all human life and in
the building up of communities.
It took many years for Schleiermacher to arrive at the contours
of his own system. Crucial to his philosophical development was
his encounter with Spinoza, Kant, Leibniz, Jacobi, and Fichte. Kant’s
influence was the most decisive; even as he moved beyond him to
develop his own original system, the ideas he took from Kant con-
tinued to shape his philosophical outlook. Any attempt to under-
stand Schleiermacher’s mature thought must take into account his
encounter with these thinkers. The goal of the present study is to
provide an exposition and analysis of the key metaphysical concepts
undergirding Schleiermacher’s mature ethical system. Because these
ideas were developed over time and in relation to the philosophy of
other figures, an exposition of Schleiermacher’s philosophical ethics
requires an engagement with Schleiermacher’s philosophical devel-
opment. As a result, two goals drive the organization of the present
study: first, an exposition of Schleiermacher’s metaphysics, especially
as this metaphysics touches upon the problem of the nature of self-
consciousness and personal identity, and second, an analysis of the
development of his thought.
In the first chapter, “The Philosopher’s Stone,” I examine sev-
eral fundamental philosophical problems regarding the conditions
of the possibility of moral transformation preoccupying the early
Schleiermacher, especially as he struggled to come to terms with
Kant’s practical philosophy. Included in this set of issues is the prob-
lem of transcendental freedom and how it relates to an agent’s char-
acter, as well as the problem of the relation of the faculty of repre-
sentation (knowing) to the faculty of desire (doing). Both questions
have to do with how we are to conceive of the unity of the self
throughout its changing states. The principle focus of the chapter is
Schleiermacher’s early essay On Freedom (1790–2), although I also
look at Schleiermacher’s notes on Kant’s second Critique (1789), the
third of his Dialogues on Freedom (1789), and his critical review of
Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1799). In these
early pieces Schleiermacher argued against Kant’s idea of transcen-
dental freedom and for a compatabilist view of freedom allowing us
to affirm the continuity of an agent’s character. However, he also
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takes note of the significant difficulties that such a compatibilist
understanding of human freedom poses with regard to understand-
ing the individual as the initiator of an action. Moreover, he struggles
with an essential problem posed by Kant’s fundamental division of
the sources of human knowledge into spontaneity and receptivity.
If the two are fundamentally distinct, how then is it possible to
relate knowing to doing? Knowing has to do with our spontaneity,
while doing is dependent on a moment of desire that spurs action,
and desire, Kant believed (for good reasons), has to do with our
passivity or receptivity. How, then, is it possible that desire can
relate to our spontaneity (e.g., the moral law itself, which is gen-
erated by practical reason), so that we can recognize the worth of
the moral law? Both Schleiermacher’s concern with the problem of
the continuity of an agent’s character throughout change, as well
as his early treatment of the problem of the relation of the faculty
of representation (knowing) to the faculty of desire (doing) sheds
light on his later, mature analysis of self-consciousness as grounded
in a transcendental moment (the immediate self-consciousness).
This transcendental moment not only makes possible the transition
between knowing and doing, but also grounds the unity of a person’s
character.
In the second and third chapters I provide an in-depth analysis of
two of Schleiermacher’s early pieces on Spinoza, Spinozism and the
Short Presentation of the Spinozistic System, both from about 1793–4.
The position put forward in these essays is fully consonant with
Schleiermacher’s earlier determinism. My second chapter, “The Prin-
ciple of Individuation,” examines the grounds for Schleiermacher’s
claim that there are no genuine individuals. Schleiermacher adopts
Kant’s distinction between noumena and phenomena; while indi-
viduals may appear at the phenomenal level, we cannot identify a
noumenal principle of individuation guaranteeing the identity of a
thing. An analysis of appearances reveals that each appearance fully
depends for its existence on what is different and outside of it. As
such, there are no real, noumenal agents; everything about the self
is fully determined by what precedes its existence and lies outside of
it. Yet all of these arguments are made in the context of his adop-
tion of Kant’s transcendental idealism. The adoption of this stand-
point, I argue, proves decisive for Schleiermacher’s later thought.
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While Schleiermacher gives up his Spinozism, Kant’s analysis of
transcendental subjectivity remains a fundamental feature of his
philosophical and theological system.8 It is this focus on the tran-
scendental conditions of subjectivity that allow him to affirm later
that the self is transcendentally free in relation to the world; the self
is not a mere turnspit mechanistically determined by this-worldly
forces. Rather, the immediate self-consciousness is the principle locus
wherein the divine causality is immediately operative as a formal and
in-forming cause in the deepest recesses of the self.
My third chapter, “Personal Identity,” continues the analysis
of Spinozism. In it I focus on Schleiermacher’s long discussion
of personal identity. This discussion is extremely significant for
Schleiermacher’s later understanding of reflective self-consciousness.
In it Schleiermacher reveals himself to be intimately acquainted with
both Kant’s transcendental deduction as well as Kant’s chapter on
the Paralogisms in the Critique of Pure Reason. Most significantly,
Schleiermacher argues, in agreement with Kant, that we have no
access to a substantial noumenal self. Rather, identity of the subject
is cognizable only in and through the synthesis of the manifold of
intuition. The only reflective access we have to the self is through
the products of its transcendental activity; the transcendental activity
itself, however, cannot become an object for consciousness but is
only given in immediacy. The philosophical position Schleiermacher
develops here is key to an understanding of the position he develops
in the Monologen, which is more representative of his mature thought.
In “The World is the Mirror of the Self,” I discuss Schleiermacher’s
Monologen in the context of his 1797–8 study of Leibniz’s philoso-
phy. It is during this period that Schleiermacher had his first direct
contact with Leibniz, reading the original sources. Prior to this
period his knowledge of Leibniz was second hand. Here we find a
more positive reception of Leibniz’s thought, one that remains deci-
sive for Schleiermacher’s mature system. I argue, however, that this
positive reception of Leibniz is mediated through Schleiermacher’s
adoption of Kant’s understanding of transcendental subjectivity.
8 On this crucial point my reading diverges from that of Julia Lamm in The Living
God: Schleiermacher’s Theological Appropriation of Spinoza, who does not recognize a
fundamental change in Schleiermacher’s later thought on this foundational issue.
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Schleiermacher also agrees with Kant, over against Leibniz, that indi-
viduals stand in genuine interaction with one another. It is here that
we find Schleiermacher affirming both a qualified monadic individu-
alism as well as transcendental freedom. Both affirmations go hand in
hand. The actions of the self are not merely the products of a series of
inter-worldly causes. Schleiermacher recognized, along with Leibniz
and Kant, that the categories of substance and intelligible freedom
mutually imply one another; something is a substance if its mode
of action is grounded in its intrinsic properties. Furthermore, the
self, in its fundamental transcendental unity and activity, is not an
object that can stand in a causal relation to other objects in the world.
Through the immediate self-consciousness the self stands in direct
relation to the absolute; this is a relation unmediated by objects in
the world given to consciousness. It is through this relation that the
self is free in relation to the world. In the Monologen Schleiermacher
presents his vision of the transcendentally free being who expresses
him- or herself into the world. The self has no reflexive access to itself
aside from the way that it unites its representations and constructs
its world; in a play on Leibniz’s idea of the self as the mirror of
the world, Schleiermacher affirms that “the world is spirit’s most
beautiful work, its self-created mirror.” Here Schleiermacher is well
on his way to one of the fundamental ideas behind the Dialectic and
The Christian Faith, namely, that the rule through which a person
connects representations and thereby represents the world to herself
is seamlessly integrated with her desires, and hence with her actions.
All are elements of the person’s self-expression, itself the product
of the transcendental activity of the self. The self knows itself through
this expressive activity, which is received and reflected back to it
through the activity of others.
Chapter 5, “The Highest Good,” begins an analysis of
Schleiermacher’s Notes on Ethics from 1805/06. This is an outline
of Schleiermacher’s mature ethical system. In this chapter I examine
Schleiermacher’s understanding of the highest good, the final goal
of all ethical action. In the Notes on Ethics Schleiermacher describes
the highest good as the “ensouling of human nature by reason.” His
exposition of the highest good reveals his eschatological conviction
that the natural world will be perfected. The goal of moral action
does not lie beyond this world; it is the perfection of this one.
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Consequently, Schleiermacher’s conception of the highest good
stands in sharp contrast to Kant’s. The first part of the chapter
examines Schleiermacher’s early critique of Kant’s understanding of
the highest good. This analysis sheds light on his later critique of
Kant, especially as Schleiermacher developed it in his Outline of a
Critique of Previous Ethical Theories (1803). Whereas a fundamental
bifurcation between reason and nature pervades all of Kant’s
philosophy, Schleiermacher held that if human nature as it appears
in this world is to be ensouled, it must be possible for the sensuously
conditioned desires to be infused with ethical content.
In Chapter 6 “Individual and Community,” I outline Schleierma-
cher’s vision of how human nature is to be ensouled through reason.
Here I focus on Schleiermacher’s positive conception and valuation of
embodied, finite individuality as the fundamental building block of
community. I provide an analysis of Schleiermacher’s understanding
of embodied individuality, the finite and perspectival character of all
human knowledge that issues from such a standpoint, and the char-
acter of community, established through dialogue, as that through
which finite standpoints can be enlarged to include the perspective
of others and of other groups. For Schleiermacher it is through the
establishment of community that human nature is ensouled.
The way that a person’s relation to one historical individual and the
community founded by him can be the occasion for the transforma-
tion of the self through the mediation of the divine love is the subject
of Chapter 7, “Transforming the Self through Christ.” Schleierma-
cher’s claim that it is through the work of Christ in transforming
ethical outlooks that the God-consciousness is freed is certainly a
theological one. Nevertheless, bolstering the claim are fundamental
presuppositions regarding the nature of Christ’s God-consciousness,
as well as an understanding of how the self-consciousness of one indi-
vidual can transform the self-consciousness of others, a view rooted
in Schleiermacher’s ethical theory. This chapter offers an examination
of a claim central to Schleiermacher’s Christian philosophy and theol-
ogy, namely that Christ’s activity is a person forming activity through
which selves are ethically transformed.
My last chapter, “Outpourings of the Inner Fire,” explores the
significance of Schleiermacher’s understanding of the moral trans-
formation of the self in regard to a contemporary problem in the
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philosophy of religion, namely, that of religious pluralism. Through
an analysis of arguments found in On Religion (especially the third
edition of 1821) as well as in the Christian Faith (second edition
1830–1), I first argue that Schleiermacher’s theory of religion offers a
generally coherent account of how it is possible that differing religious
traditions are all based on the same experience of the absolute. A
significant problem facing the religious pluralist, however, is how
to distinguish between genuine and illusory religious experience. I
show how Schleiermacher’s theory offers clear criteria for making
such judgments. Since the immediate self-consciousness, the locus of
the self ’s relation to the divine, also stands in relation to the moments
of the sensuous self consciousness, it is the character of this relation
between the immediate, transcendental self-consciousness and the
moments of the sensuous self consciousness that determines how the
world is understood, valued, and felt. Consequently for Schleierma-
cher the test of true piety lies not in the orthodox character of a
person’s beliefs, but in how the person views and values the world
and others around him or her, and in the actions that issue from
these ways of taking the world. While it may be impossible to achieve
a universal theology, we may yet come to a consensus regarding a
universal practice and the experience that attends it.
Despite the importance of Schleiermacher’s ethical theory, it has
received little attention in the English-speaking world.9 Richard
R. Niebuhr’s Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion: A New Intro-
duction10 called attention to Schleiermacher’s understanding of the
person-forming activity of Christ. However, the book is more con-
cerned with Schleiermacher’s theology and does not offer a systematic
analysis of the relation of Schleiermacher’s philosophy of religion and
9 This is partly due to the fact that many of Schleiermacher’s most significant
writings on ethics have only recently been translated into English, or are yet to be
translated. His Outline of a Critique of Previous Ethical Systems remains untranslated.
Furthermore, Brent Sockness has called attention to the “unfinished and initially
unpublished character of Schleiermacher’s mature work in the philosophical disci-
plines.” He notes that “aside from the Academy addresses, which were printed in a rel-
atively obscure organ of the Prussian Academy of Sciences, the Grundlinien einer Kritik
der bisherigen Sittenlehre was the only major philosophical work of Schleiermacher
to be published during his lifetime. Consequently, his initial philosophical impact
occurred almost exclusively via his lectures at the university”; Sockness, “The Forgot-
ten Moralist: Friedrich Schleiermacher and the Science of Spirit,” 326.
10 Richard R. Niebuhr, Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion: A New Introduction.
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theology to his ethics. Another book concerned with Schleiermacher’s
ethics is Albert Blackwell’s Schleiermacher’s Early Philosophy of Life:
Determinism, Freedom, Phantasy.11 This book focuses on the early
Schleiermacher, but does not offer an account of how his early ethics
relate to his more mature views, or how these hook up with his phi-
losophy and theology. Other English speaking treatments are limited
to journal articles.12 My own book is intended as a corrective to this
neglect; it is my hope that both philosophers and theologians will
come to recognize the importance of Schleiermacher’s oeuvre.
11 Albert Blackwell, Schleiermacher’s Early Philosophy of Life: Determinism,
Freedom, Phantasy.
12 Three of the most significant treatments in journal articles are by Brent Sockness
and have appeared quite recently. These are: “Was Schleiermacher a Virtue Ethicist?
Tugend and Bildung in the Early Ethical Writings” and “The Forgotten Moralist:
Friedrich Schleiermacher and the Science of Spirit.” In the latter essay Sockness details
the reception of Schleiermacher’s ethics in both Germany and in the English-speaking
world. In his article “Schleiermacher and the Ethics of Authenticity,” Sockness argues
that Schleiermacher is not successful in fusing his transcendental turn with his ethics
of authenticity. This study will show that Schleiermacher was in fact quite successful in
uniting both themes, especially when his ethics are understood in relation to his phi-
losophy of religion. An excellent description of the development of Schleiermacher’s
ethics is Frederick Beiser’s “Schleiermacher’s Ethics,” in the Cambridge Companion
to Schleiermacher. Other significant English language treatments of Schleiermacher’s
ethics appearing in journal articles include Julia Lamm, “The Early Philosophical
Roots of Schleiermacher’s Notion of Gefühl, 1788–1794,” and a series of essays by
John Crossley, including his “Schleiermacher’s Christian Ethics in Relation to his
Philosophical Ethics.”
